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CHAPTER 6
Mercantilism and Class Struggle: Italy  
in the International Economy, 1960–1990
Francesco Petrini
The unheralded economic crisis in Italy in 2008 and then its expansion 
brought a change of perception in the public debate about the coun-
try’s economy and its prospects. Although in the past there had been 
no dearth of apologists of the virtues of the Italian model of ‘industrial 
districts’ and export-oriented small- and medium-sized enterprises, it 
is nowadays much more common to hear or read about the ‘economic 
decline’ of the country.
This attitude has also extended to academic literature. The Bank of 
Italy recently published a large volume, edited by Gianni Toniolo, on 
Italy’s economic history from its unification (1861) to the present day, 
which will certainly become a milestone in the literature.1 The work 
provides ample statistical evidence of the interruption, from the early 
1990s onwards, of the century-long process of convergence of the Italian 
© The Author(s) 2018 
A. Varsori and B. Zaccaria (eds.), Italy in the International System from 
Détente to the End of the Cold War, Security, Conflict and Cooperation  
in the Contemporary World, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-65163-7_6
F. Petrini (*) 
University of Padova, Padua, Italy
e-mail: francesco.petrini@unipd.it
1 Gianni Toniolo (ed.), L’Italia e l’economia mondiale. Dall’Unità a oggi (Venezia: 
Marsilio, 2013).
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2  F. PETRINI
economy towards the level of welfare of the most advanced countries. As 
regards the causes of this dismal performance, Toniolo’s work presents a 
general interpretation which hinges on the inability of Italian society to 
adapt to the new conditions caused by the ‘second wave of globalisation’ 
after the 1970s. Emphasis is put on the burden of public debt, the inad-
equacy of the reforms of the country’s economic and social institutions 
(privatisation, flexibility in the labour market, market liberalisation and 
deregulation) and the need for investment in education.
In this chapter, we describe some aspects of the same phenomenon 
but from a different viewpoint—one which discusses class interests 
and the conflicts among them. The focus is on the development of the 
Italian economy from 1945 to the 1990s, starting with the 1963 cri-
sis, which put an end to the ‘economic miracle’, and ending in 1992, 
when the lira left the European Monetary System. It was a period of 
sustained and unprecedented growth for the Italian economy, during 
which Italy caught up with other advanced industrial economies. At 
the same time, it was in those years that we can find the roots of the 
problems which have afflicted the Italian economy over the last two 
decades.
Italy’s Road to ModeRnIsatIon
In 1945, Italy’s economy was in a dire state. The structural weak-
nesses of a poor country, with low levels of savings and incomes, with 
very few raw materials within its territory, and afflicted by a huge sur-
plus of manpower, were all worsened by the destruction wrought by the 
Second World War. In these conditions, Italy’s only asset appeared to be 
a vast reserve of hard-working, cheap manpower. In the spring of 1946, 
in a declaration before the Economic Commission of the Constituent 
Assembly, Vittorio Valletta, chief executive officer of Fiat, the largest and 
most politically influential private Italian company, stated:
In Italy the mechanical industry in general, and the automotive industry 
in particular, though they suffer from the deficiency of raw materials, can 
count on low labor costs, more than anywhere else and for decades: should 
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6 MERCANTILISM AND CLASS STRUGGLE: …  3
an improvement in living conditions occur, this will be general and the dif-
ference between us and the others will persist.2
The essential idea was to take advantage of the low level of salaries 
to conquer foreign markets. This view dominated the mental horizon of 
Italy’s political-economic establishment during the years leading to the 
‘economic miracle’ and persisted, mutatis mutandis, in the subsequent 
decades. Expansion into foreign markets appeared to be the only path 
to recovery: in light of the poverty of the vast majority of its population, 
which greatly limited the potential of the internal market, Italy had to 
find its space for growth abroad by taking advantage of the low cost of 
labour. Thus, on one hand, manpower costs had to stay low, to boost 
the competitiveness of Italian products on foreign markets. On the other 
hand, low purchasing power due to similarly low wage levels could only 
reinforce such a mercantilist effort. In other words, the ‘mercantilist’ 
stance produced, and was a product of, the perpetuation of a structural 
trait in Italy’s economy—what Franco Bonelli has called the ‘equilibrium 
of low consumption and low wages’.3 In this perspective, as explicitly 
stated in the Confindustria Bulletin of November 1945 (that is, during a 
period of rampant inflation): ‘It is not a question of adjusting salaries to 
the cost of living, but the cost of living to salaries.’4 Ultimately, as noted 
by Giancarlo Provasi, the Italian industrial bourgeoisie envisaged a process 
of accumulation, based on containment of wages and workers’ standard 
2 Ministero per la Costituente-Commissione economica, Rapporto della Commissione eco-
nomica, L’industria – Appendice alla Relazione (Interrogatori) (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico 
dello Stato, 1946) 2:345–355. On the political economy of the Italian reconstruction from 
1945 until the early 1960s, still illuminating are: Fernando Vianello, ‘Lo sviluppo capitalis-
tico italiano dal dopoguerra al “miracolo economico”: una veduta di insieme’, in Il profitto e il 
potere, ed. Fernando Vianello (Torino: Rosenberg & Sellier, 1979), 21–36. For a general over-
view of the characteristics of the socio-economic compromise which governed Italy’s growth 
from 1945 to the 1960s, see Fabrizio Barca, ‘Compromesso senza riforme nel capitalismo 
italiano’, in Storia del capitalismo italiano, ed. Fabrizio Barca (Roma: Donzelli, 1997), 3–115.
3 Franco Bonelli, ‘Il capitalismo italiano. Linee generali di interpretazione, in Storia 
d’Italia, Annali, I. Dal feudalesimo al capitalismo’, eds. Ruggiero Romano and Corrado 
Vivanti (Torino: Einaudi, 1978), 1193–1255.
4 Cited in Massimo Legnani, ‘L’utopia grande borghese’, in Marcello Flores et al., Gli 
anni della Costituente. Strategie dei governi e delle classi sociali (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1983), 
140.
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4  F. PETRINI
of living, more than on the growth of productivity.5 In fact, the situation 
developed quite differently and productivity grew at an unprecedented 
pace during the ‘golden years’, but the bias against wage increases 
remained.
This position excluded the possibility of any kind of Keynesian-
inspired policies of support to internal demand. As observed by Mariano 
D’Antonio, adopting expansive policies would have meant sacrificing the 
more backward sectors of the industrial system.6 Redistributive policies 
would also have put an end to the advantage of low labour costs and 
in general a redistribution of power between workers and employers—
highly undesirable from the viewpoint of the latter.
Two points must be clarified here. First, we are not assuming an 
Italian Sonderweg: the ‘mercantilist’ anti-Keynesian attitude was by no 
means peculiar only to Italy. After 1945, it was widely shared in the capi-
talist world, first by Italy’s two former allies in the Second World War, 
although in different ways. The Federal Republic of Germany could be 
considered the prime example of a mercantilist stance in Europe as well 
as presenting, through the Ordoliberal school of thought, the clearest 
alternative to Keynesianism at the time. However, West Germany had a 
particular way of increasing international competitiveness: the key fac-
tor was to keep inflation low in a system of fixed exchange rates and 
thus achieve devaluation in real terms with respect to countries with 
higher inflation rates.7 Italy, under the guidance of its Central Bank, first 
6 Mariano D’Antonio, Sviluppo e crisi del capitalismo italiano 1951–1972 (Bari: De 
Donato, 1973), 173–174.
7 On Germany’s ‘monetary mercantilism’ see: Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, ‘Monetary Policy 
Under Fixed Exchange Rates (1948–70)’, in Fifty Years of the Deutsche Mark: Central 
Bank and the Currency in Germany since 1948, ed. Ernst Baltensperger (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 307–402; Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, ‘Monetary Policy in Germany 
Since 1948. National Tradition, International Best Practice or Ideology’, in Central Banks 
as Economic Institutions, ed. Jean Philippe Touffut, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 
2008), 22–51. For an introduction to Ordoliberalism, stressing its characteristic ‘third 
way’ between laissez-faire and collectivism, see Werner Bonefeld, ‘Freedom and the Strong 
State: On German Ordoliberalism’, New Political Economy 17, no. 5 (2012), 633–656. 
See also: Ralf Ptak, ‘Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the Ordoliberal Foundations of 
the Social Market Economy’, in The Road From Mont Pélerin: The Making of The Neoliberal 
Thought Collective, eds. Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 98–138.
5 Giancarlo Provasi, Borghesia industriale e Democrazia cristiana. Sviluppo economico e 
mediazione politica dalla ricostruzione agli anni settanta (Bari: De Donato, 1976), 16.
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6 MERCANTILISM AND CLASS STRUGGLE: …  5
followed a similar strategy (in 1959, the lira was assigned an ‘Oscar’ by 
the Financial Times as the world’s most stable currency) but, being char-
acterised by class relations much more conflict-prone than those prevail-
ing in West Germany, it was ultimately obliged to follow a different path.
Second, the convergence around a mercantilist conception based on 
containment of labour costs did not reduce the many reasons for con-
trast within Italian capitalism. Thus, from Valletta’s viewpoint, in order 
to find space indispensable for deploying a Fordian-style mode of mass 
production, foreign markets were essential. Other well-known business-
men were not at all convinced of the applicability of mass production 
technologies to the Italian situation,8 mainly because they feared the 
social consequences,9 although they were in any case convinced of the 
desirability of greater Italian participation in international trade. This was 
for contingent reasons, as in the case of the textile industry, which aimed 
at profiting from the disappearance of German and Japanese competitors 
from the markets; and partly for political reasons, to conceal collabora-
tion with the state-managed, autarchic system of the Fascist era, but it 
was mainly due to the conviction that a system of managed free trade 
could play to the advantage of low-cost Italian products.10
In addition, the anti-Keynesian mercantilist outlook was seen as the 
point of contact with another crucial component of the post-war social 
compromise: the technocratic élite at the helm of state-owned compa-
nies and the Bank of Italy, the country’s main decision-making centre 
for monetary and economic policy. It is true that there was a wide gap 
between the attitude of the state technocracy, whose ultimate aim was 
to strengthen and modernise Italy’s industrial base, and the position 
of Confindustria, which aimed at conserving power equilibria within 
8 For a brief overview of the Italian debate about adopting mass production, see Franco 
Amatori and Andrea Colli, Impresa e industria in Italia. Dall’Unità a oggi (Venezia: 
Marsilio, 2003), 198–200.
9 For a clear description of these preoccupations, see Luigi Einaudi, ‘Economia di con-
correnza e capitalismo storico. La terza via fra i secoli XVIII e XIX’, Rivista di storia eco-
nomica, June 1942, 49–72.
10 On private industrialists’ positions regarding Italy’s insertion in the international econ-
omy see, for example: Francesco Petrini, Il liberismo a una dimensione. La Confindustria 
e l’integrazione europea 1947–1957 (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2005), Chap. 1; Francesco 
Petrini, ‘Americanismo e privatismo. La Confindustria e il piano Marshall’, Ventunesimo 
secolo, no. 13 (2007): 117–151.
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6  F. PETRINI
private capitalism and keeping workers at a safe distance. Yet, in prac-
tice, both positions saw in mercantilism and wage containment the recipe 
for reconstructing the Italian economy.11 This appears clearly in Appunto 
per un piano di ricostruzione economica dell’Italia (Note for a plan of 
economic reconstruction of Italy), a document drawn up in 1944 by an 
anonymous executive of IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale, 
a holding which regrouped state-participating assets in the industry 
and banking sectors), which foreshadowed the lines of development to 
be followed in the years to come.12 According to that document, Italy 
should aim at strengthening:
those visible and invisible accounts [manufacturing exports, migration, 
tourism] susceptible to give a real contribution to the balance of payments. 
Traditionally exporting sectors should have precedence in the reconstruc-
tion process.13
As regards internal demand, the Appunto advocated a ‘strict national 
discipline’ to contain internal consumption and favour the creation of 
savings, in order not to frustrate efforts at modernising the industrial 
apparatus: ‘the compression of our consumption will have to continue 
for a long time’.14 In this view, as Rolf Petri points out, ‘substantial wage 
increases and a growth in public spending to support consumption and 
social welfare had to be eschewed’.15 This was the technocrats’ outlook 
in 1944; in the post-war period, although in milder tones, the substance 
did not change very much. Men like Donato Menichella, until 1960 
the governor of the Bank of Italy, his successor Guido Carli, and other 
11 On the viewpoint and role of Italian technocrats, see Rolf Petri, Storia economica 
d’Italia. Dalla Grande guerra al miracolo economico (1918–1963) (Bologna: il Mulino, 
2002), 291 et seq.
12 IRI Historical Archive (Rome), Numerazione nera, Archivio IRI 1943–1947, Appunti 
e relazioni varie, fasc. 81, Appunto per un piano di ricostruzione economica dell'Italia, 8 
August 1944. For a thorough analysis of the origin and significance of the document, see 
Rolf Petri, Dalla ricostruzione al miracolo economico, in Storia d’Italia V: La repubblica, 
eds. Giovanni Sabbatucci and Vittorio Vidotto (Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1997), 313–439.
13 IRI Historical Archive, Numerazione nera, Archivio IRI 1943–1947, Appunti e relazi-
oni varie, fasc. 81, Appunto per un piano di ricostruzione economica dell'Italia, 8 August 
1944, 6.
14 Ibid., 10.
15 Rolf Petri, Storia economica d’Italia, 301.
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6 MERCANTILISM AND CLASS STRUGGLE: …  7
members of the economic intelligentsia, such as Pasquale Saraceno and 
Ezio Vanoni, continued to advocate and practise a policy aimed at con-
taining domestic consumption and imports, in order to encourage sav-
ings and create the resources for completion of industrialisation without 
borrowing from abroad.16 As Carli said: ‘Our watchword was: export, 
export, export.’17
PolItIcal asPects of full eMPloyMent: the end  
of the ‘econoMIc MIRacle’
It was on this basis that the extraordinary growth of the 1950s took 
place, climaxing in the ‘economic miracle’ at the end of that decade. One 
essential component of the ‘miracle’ was exports, which increased at a 
yearly rate of 12.5%.18 Private consumption grew at a more moderate, 
albeit considerable, 5.9% per year. Apparently the exceptional expansion 
of the 1950s had not affected the mercantilist model of development.
However, there was another interesting trend in those years—that 
of wage shares on industrial products. This passed from 62.7% in 1951 
to 48.8% in 1962.19 In practice, the largest part of the huge increase 
in productivity which took place during the decade went to the bene-
fit of profit. In the 1950s, the position of force enjoyed by employers 
in industrial relations prevented workers from acting effectively to con-
trast this trend. However, accelerated growth throughout the decade 
resulted in a reduction of the manpower surplus which, in turn, caused 
an increase in the bargaining power of industrial workers. In the early 
1960s, the labour market had shrunk to the point at which, in industrial 
16 On the Central Bank policy under Menichella, see Alfredo Gigliobianco, Via 
Nazionale. Banca d’Italia e classe dirigente. Cento anni di storia (Roma: Donzelli, 2006), 
217–248; Pasquale Saraceno, Intervista sulla ricostruzione (1943–1953), ed. Lucio Villari 
(Bari: Laterza, 1977); Antonio Magliulo, ‘La politica economica di Ezio Vanoni negli anni 
del centrismo’, Studi e Note di Economia, no. 1 (2007): 77–114.
17 Guido Carli, Cinquant’anni di vita italiana (Roma/Bari: Laterza,1993), 140.
18 For an overview of the debate on the role of exports in Italy’s growth after 1945, cfr. 
Augusto Graziani, Lo sviluppo dell’economia italiana. Dalla ricostruzione alla moneta euro-
pea (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2000), 56–65.
19 Riccardo Bellofiore, I lunghi anni settanta. Crisi sociale e integrazione economica inter-
nazionale, in Le radici della crisi. L’Italia tra gli anni ’60 e ’70, ed. Luca Baldissara (Roma: 
Carocci, 2001), 57–102.
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8  F. PETRINI
areas (mainly in north-west Italy) employers had trouble finding work-
ers to fill existing positions. The official number of unemployed reached 
an historic all-time low of 780,000 in 1963.20 As the Polish economist 
Michał Kalecki had written 20 years earlier, a condition of full employ-
ment would inevitably lead to deep social and political changes:
Indeed, under a regime of permanent full employment, the ‘sack’ would 
cease to play its role as a disciplinary measure. The social position of the 
boss would be undermined, and the self-assurance and class-consciousness 
of the working class would grow. Strikes for wage increases and improve-
ments in conditions of work would create political tension.21
The shift in the balance of power in industrial relations did in fact lead 
to a sudden increase in conflict, marking a key passage in Italian history. 
Workers’ discontent exploded in a wave of strikes which rocked facto-
ries in the north-west. As a result, wages rose substantially: in two years, 
raises for employees grew by 43%.22 For the first time, they surpassed 
productivity growth and the wage share climbed back to 52% in 1963.
The tumultuous social change brought about by the ‘miracle’ was 
due to a profound transformation in the political landscape. This was the 
period which saw the birth of a centre-left alliance between the Christian 
Democrat party (DC, the main governing force since the institution of 
the Republic in 1946) and the Socialist party (PSI). In 1963, this alliance 
led to the constitution of a government presided over by Aldo Moro of 
the DC, in which, for the first time since 1947, the PSI had ministers. 
The main aim of the new political coalition was to achieve reforms which 
were seen as the necessary complement of industrialisation. Important 
sectors of Italian society—in particular, the majority of private employ-
ers—viewed this development with alarm. In particular, they were deeply 
disturbed by the nationalisation of the electricity sector, decided by the 
government in 1962, which struck at the conservative heart of Italian 
private capitalism, with the new withholding tax on stock dividends and 
discussion on a new town-planning bill which threatened the interests of 
20 See database AMECO, at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/
SelectSerie.cfm.
21 Michał Kalecki, ‘Political Aspects of Full Employment’, The Political Quarterly, no. 4 
(1943): 322–331.
22 Carli, Cinquanta anni, 268.
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6 MERCANTILISM AND CLASS STRUGGLE: …  9
the building industry and the vast class of rentiers and small proprietors. 
In general, they feared that the country was slipping towards a socialist, 
planned economy.23
The conservative sectors of Italian society found their main political 
support in the right wing of the DC, the ‘Dorotei’ faction, whose lead-
ing figure in economic matters, Emilio Colombo, was minister of the 
Treasury. These preoccupations, coupled with the worries of the Central 
Bank, were under Carli’s guidance.
In fact, the immediate consequence of the workers’ unrest had 
been soaring inflation. This was alimented by employers’ attempts to 
defend their profits, passing the increase in labour costs to prices. As 
Confindustria’s weekly newsletter ‘L’Organizzazione industriale’ put it: 
‘The transfer of the rise in costs to prices becomes inevitable under the 
pressure of the reduction of profit margins on which firms operate.’24 
Increased wages and rising inflation resulted in worsening of the trade 
balance, threatening the very core of the mercantilist strategy.25 In addi-
tion, the profit squeeze resulting from the wage increase disrupted the 
Bank of Italy’s strategy.
Since 1947, the Bank of Italy had successfully pursued a policy mix 
of monetary stability, balanced current accounts and non-inflationary 
growth. In order to achieve this growth, the key variable in the eyes of 
the Central Bank was profitability. Only adequately high profits (given 
the scarcity of endogenous credit) could ensure the investments nec-
essary to absorb the chronic manpower surplus without recurring to 
foreign capital. Conversely, due to the fact that workers’ marginal pro-
pensity to consume was higher than that of their employers’, in the 
Bank’s view, a wage rise would result in a greater demand for con-
sumer goods, thus feeding inflation, higher imports and current account 
23 Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy (London: Penguin, 1990), 264–273. 
As quoted by Ginsborg (265), on 4 January 1962 the Italian business newspaper Il Sole 24 
Ore warned small and medium firms that they could be faced ‘with a situation similar to 
that of their Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Chinese colleagues around the year 1950’.
24 ‘Una più seria politica economica’, L’Organizzazione industriale, no. 19, 9 May 1963.
25 In 1963, the external trade deficit exceeded $1960 billion, or 3.7% of the GDP. The 
Banca d’Italia’s currency reserves fell to 1700 billion lire from their peak of 2600 billion 
recorded in 1962. See Pierluigi Ciocca and Gianni Toniolo (eds.), Storia economia d’Italia, 
2, Annali (Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1999) 402.
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10  F. PETRINI
imbalances and, lastly, causing an arrest in growth.26 Yet the centrality 
of profits in guaranteeing capital accumulation did not translate, in the 
Bank’s policy, into a dogmatic concept. Its attitude had always been 
characterised by policy flexibility and theoretical eclecticism. So, in the 
period immediately before the 1962–63 inflationary crisis, it adopted an 
easy monetary policy to sustain the price increases which defended profit 
levels. In this regard, Carli is very clear in his memoirs:
The political motivation of monetary expansion, which we did not oppose, 
was this: to allow firms to transfer rising costs to prices, without having 
to squeeze their profit margins. […] The essential aim was defence of pri-
vate companies and capitalist industry, seriously jeopardised by excessive 
nationalisation by the centre-left [and by] the trade unions which, vehe-
mently and often violently, claimed increasing portions of that ‘surplus 
value’ which, according to the prevailing ideology, was expropriated by the 
capitalists.27
However, this policy could not long continue in the Bretton Woods sys-
tem of semi-fixed exchange rates. In the light of the rapid deterioration 
of the Italian balance of payments, Italy’s monetary and political authori-
ties were faced with a choice: either to devalue the lira or to apply a strict 
deflationary policy. Devaluation of the lira encountered the opposition of 
the USA, concerned about the stability of the whole system, and of the 
European partners, threatened by the competitiveness of Italian exports. 
It was rejected by the Banca d’Italia itself, for reasons of prestige and 
credibility.28 Thus, between the second half of 1963 and early 1964, the 
26 For a discussion of this viewpoint, see Banca d’Italia, Considerazioni finali 1963, in 
Idem, Considerazioni finali 1960–1981, http://www.bancaditalia.it/chi-siamo/storia/gov-
ernatori-direttori-generali/CF_1960_1981.pdf (accessed on 13 January 2017), 111–149. 
For an analysis of this aspect of the Bank’s conceptions, see Michele Fratianni and Franco 
Spinelli, Storia monetaria d'Italia. Lira e politica monetaria dall'Unità all'Unione Europea 
(Milano: ETAS, 2001), 448; Eugenio Gaiotti and Salvatore Rossi, La politica monetaria 
italiana nella svolta degli anni Ottanta, in Gli anni Ottanta come storia, eds. Simona 
Colarizi et al. (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2004) 281–340; Alfredo Gigliobianco, Via 
Nazionale. Banca d’Italia e classe dirigente. Cento anni di storia (Roma: Donzelli, 2006), 
282.
27 Carli, Cinquanta anni, 268–269.
28 Antimo Verde, ‘La crisi della lira del 1963–64, una crisi senza svalutazione: perché?’, 
Studi e Note di Economia, no. 1 (2002): 75–95. On the contrary views of the other EEC 
countries, especially France, see Paolo Peluffo, Introduzione: ‘Il cavallo non beve’. Dibattiti 
negli anni Sessanta su politica monetaria e programmazione economica, in Guido Carli, 
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6 MERCANTILISM AND CLASS STRUGGLE: …  11
Bank reversed its policy of monetary expansion and applied a very restric-
tive one,29 which, in conjunction with the fiscal measures taken by the 
government, more or less put an end to the ‘economic miracle’. This 
deflationary turn, which appeared to seal the fate of the reformist ambi-
tions of the centre-left, was welcomed by employers, in spite of the fact 
that inflation and the easy monetary policy of the previous months had 
helped them to sustain its profitability. The employers’ press explicitly 
recalled, as an example to be repeated, the 1947 manoeuvre which had 
drastically curtailed post-war inflation—at the price, however, of a seri-
ous economic stall.30 Confindustria deplored, as inadequate, the policies 
of planning and reforms supported by the socialists and the left of the 
Christian Democrat party, and pleaded for adoption of orthodox mone-
tary and fiscal policies.31 Alberto De Stefani, Mussolini’s former minister 
of finance, wrote in the daily newspaper Il Tempo: ‘His [Carli’s] recent 
declarations showed a really reassuring bravery.’32
It is important to stress the role played in these circumstances by the 
international context, the ‘vincolo esterno’ (external constraint) as it came 
to be called in the Italian debate. We have already mentioned the role 
of the Bretton Woods system, which represented an anchor for stabilis-
ing measures, in line with a long tradition of a rigid exchange rate as the 
‘highly effective arm of the lever that was pressing on the wage level’, 
Scritti scelti, eds. Paolo Peluffo and Federico Carli (Roma/Bari, Laterza, 2000), V-LIV, 
XIX.
 
29 The U-turn in monetary policy was announced by Carli in May 1963: Banca d’Italia, 
Considerazioni finali 1962, in Id., Considerazioni finali 1960–1981, 75–109, in particular, 
106.
30 ‘La stabilità monetaria. Il presupposto di ogni sviluppo economico’, L’Organizzazione 
industriale, no. 16, 18 April 1963. Particularly telling is the reference to 1947. At that 
time, as evidenced by Camillo Daneo (La politica economica della ricostruzione 1945–
1949 (Torino: Einaudi, 1975) 241), the industrialists were strongly in favour of the ‘linea 
Einaudi’ (Luigi Einaudi was the architect of the manoeuvre) which, from a financial view-
point, was actually damaging them. However, for the first time after the end of the war, it 
gave them the opportunity to initiate a vast reduction of personnel.
31 See, for example, the press communiqué issued after a meeting of the Confindustria 
governing body in June 1963, which demanded the return to ‘rigid economic and financial 
orthodoxy’ (L’Organizzazione industriale, ‘L’esigenza del ritorno all’ortodossia econom-
ica’, no. 26, June 27 1963).
32 Paolo Peluffo, “Il cavallo non beve”, op. cit., XXXIII–XXXIV.
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12  F. PETRINI
as indicated by Karl Polanyi.33 However, the 1963 crisis saw the début 
of another facet of the vincolo esterno which was to play a crucial role 
in Italian political economy in the subsequent decades: the European 
Economic Community. Within the Community, preoccupations about an 
inflationary ‘contagion’ were widespread, especially in the FRG, obliged 
to re-evaluate the deutschmark in 1961 and worrying about the influx 
of capital engendered by the weak lira.34 The French also pressed for the 
adoption of more orthodox monetary policies by the Italians, anxious 
that possible devaluation of the lira would put more pressure on their 
already unbalanced trade relations with Italy.35 In addition, France and 
the EEC Commission viewed the instability of the lira and the spectre of 
devaluation as a looming menace for the fledgling Common Agricultural 
Policy. It is by no chance that, in this phase, the Commission presented a 
project for coordinating national economic policies which in 1964 led to 
the birth of the Committee of Governors of Central Banks, the Budget 
Policy Committee and the Medium-term Economic Policy Committee.36
It was on these bases that, in February 1964, the EEC Council, com-
posed of the finance ministers, expressed its concern about the Italian 
situation.37 Two months later, the Council recommended to Italy—and 
France—to take all necessary monetary and fiscal measures to curb infla-
tion. In the case of Italy, it was explicitly stated that this aim would have 
33 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 238.
34 On the declarations of the German chancellor Ludwig Erhard, and his minister for the 
economy Kurt Schmücker, expressing worries about inflationary tension and demanding 
the institution of Community machinery to coordinate the fiscal policies of the member 
states (that is, to have some decision-making power in the policies of the more financially 
‘undisciplined’ members), see ‘Tensione delle economie del Mec’ (The Guardian, 17 
March 1964), Orientamenti, no. 453, 15 April 1964. See also Schmücker interviewed by 
Eugenio Scalfari, ‘Che si può fare per la lira’, L’Espresso, 19 July 1964. On the positions of 
the European partners and the role of the Commission, see Elena Cavalieri, Il prestito della 
Cee all’Italia del 1964: storia di un aiuto mai concesso, available online: http://www.sissco.
it/download/attivita/paper_Cavalieri.pdf. (accessed on 13 January 2017).
35 Peluffo, ‘Il cavallo non beve’, p. IX.
36 On this aspect of EEC institutional history, see Eric Bussière, Les tentatives d’une 
politique économique et monétaire, in La Commission européenne 1958–1972. Histoire 
et mémoire d’une institution, eds. Michel Dumoulin et al. (Brussels: Communautés 
Européennes, 2007), 405-424.
37 ‘La situazione economica dell’Italia è la più inflazionata in seno al Mec’, 
L’Organizzazione industriale, no. 7, 13 February 1964.
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6 MERCANTILISM AND CLASS STRUGGLE: …  13
to be reached by the second half of 1964, thus requiring a continuation 
of the restrictive monetary policy, even though current account balances 
were showing substantial improvements.38
The deflationary front within the Italian political game welcomed 
and encouraged the external intervention, as it reinforced and legiti-
mised such a position. The employers’ press emphasised Community 
grievances and used them to present the deflationary manoeuvre as one 
of the duties of a good member of the EEC, while Colombo skilfully 
used it to press his case inside the government.39 On 20 May 1964, 
Prime Minister Aldo Moro received a letter from the Chairman of the 
Commission, Walter Hallstein, in which the measures taken so far by the 
government were defined as ‘insufficient’ to avoid the risk of jeopard-
ising the construction of the Common Market.40 Hallstein suggested 
a number of measures, ranging from cuts in public expenditure and 
investments (which sounded a death knell for reformist ambitions), to 
increased taxes, and culminated in the suggestion to institute an income 
policy to control wage dynamics. To support these requests, on 18–19 
June the Commission vicepresident Robert Marjolin went to Rome to 
meet the Italian authorities. His message was thus summed up by Pietro 
Nenni (secretary of the Socialist party and vicechairman of the Council 
of Ministers) in his diary: ‘Tax incomes mercilessly and contain wages’.41 
38 Partly thanks to the $1.275 million line of credit obtained (from various sources) in 
March through the good offices of the US administration. Cfr. Giorgio Fodor, ‘I prestiti 
internazionali all’Italia nel 1964’, in Stabilità e sviluppo negli anni cinquanta, L’Italia nel 
contesto internazionale, ed. Franco Cotula (Roma/Bari: Laterza, 2000), I:401–439.
39 In this passage, I refer to: Francesco Petrini, ‘Grande mercato, bassi salari: la 
Confindustria e l’integrazione europea, 1947–1964’, in L’Italia nella costruzione europea. 
Un bilancio storico (1957–2007), eds. Piero Craveri and Antonio Varsori (Milano: Franco 
Angeli, 2009), 233–258.
40 See text of letter in Mimmo Franzinelli and Alessandro Giacone (eds.), Il riform-
ismo alla prova. Il primo governo Moro nei documenti e nelle parole dei protagonisti (ottobre 
1963-agosto 1964) (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2012), 359–363, Doc. 346, Lettera del presidente 
della Commissione della CEE Hallstein a S.E. il presidente del Consiglio Aldo Moro, 20 May 
1964.
41 Franzinelli and Giacone (eds.), Il riformismo alla prova, 430, Doc. 414. Diario 
di Nenni, 19 June 1964. Cavalieri shows that Marjolin, in a ‘very questionable choice’, 
decided not to consider a report prepared by a Commission expert, which showed that 
Italy was by now out of the crisis (Cavalieri, Il prestito Cee all’Italia, 10).
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14  F. PETRINI
Confindustria’s press gave prominence to the talks, to emphasise the 
government’s difficulties and to strengthen opposition to reforms:
Marjolin’s mission has made clear the EEC’s position of extreme anxiety 
about an Italian economy which has reached breaking point, due both 
to the inadequacy of the counter-cyclical measures taken hitherto and to 
internecine struggles inside the government which prevent the adoption of 
serious and vigorous measures.42
Eventually, the progressive forces within the government found them-
selves isolated and were obliged to accept the deflationary measures. The 
already divided government foundered and Moro resigned. Years later, 
in 1978, in a memoir written while he was a prisoner in the hands of the 
‘Red Brigades’ extremist group, he described EEC interference in Italian 
affairs through Marjolin’s visit as ‘a grave fact’.43
The restrictive manoeuvre achieved its objectives. Inflation returned 
under control. The abrupt slowing-down of the economy caused a surge 
in unemployment—the number of jobless returned to over a million—
but order was restored on the factory floor. With labour costs again 
under control, the previous conditions of capital accumulation were 
also restored. From 1966, the GDP had been rising again at a very sus-
tained pace. But this growth had a very different quality from that of the 
‘miracle’ years: it began—to use Riccardo Bellofiore’s words—a phase of 
‘accumulation without investments’.44 Capitalists reacted to the social 
turmoil of the early part of the decade with a ‘strike’ in investments, 
preferring to transfer capital abroad, legally or illegally.45 Thus, growth 
became even more dependent on exports. The gains in productivity, 
42 ‘Il riequilibrio dell’economia italiana nel quadro del Mec’, L’Organizzazione industri-
ale, no. 26, 25 June 1964.
43 This quotation comes from Moro’s memoirs, published in Sergio Flamigni, ‘Il 
mio sangue ricadrà su di loro.’ Gli scritti di Aldo Moro prigioniero delle Br (Milano: Kaos 
Edizioni, 1998) 221–226. It should be added that, in January 1968, in a speech to par-
liament, Moro said the opposite, defining Marjolin’s visit as ‘the most discreet, construc-
tive, respectful one could imagine’ (Miguel Gotor, Il memoriale della Repubblica (Torino: 
Einaudi, 2011), 513–551.
44 Riccardo Bellofiore et al., ‘Il presente come storia. Un incontro su Paul Sweezy’, 
L’ospite ingrato, no. 1 (2005): 197–236.
45 Michele Salvati, Economia e politica in Italia dal dopoguerra ad oggi (Milano: Garzanti, 
1986) 89–97.
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
A
u
th
o
r 
P
ro
o
f
Layout: A5 HuSSci Book ID: 417877_1_En Book ISBN: 978-3-319-65163-7
Chapter No.: 6 Date: 23 August 2017 19:25 Page: 15/34
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
F
6 MERCANTILISM AND CLASS STRUGGLE: …  15
necessary to maintain the competitiveness of Italian manufactured goods 
on international markets, were achieved with reduced manpower and 
accelerated production lines.46
In sum, the 1964 crisis marked a pivotal change in Italian history: in 
response to the exposure of the contradictions of the ‘economic mira-
cle’, the country’s establishment decided to remain on the path of ‘low 
consumption–low salaries–export push’, rather than accept the new reali-
ties brought about by modernisation, and to accommodate workers’ 
demands with a move to more internally oriented growth and efforts 
towards higher value-added production.47
the 1970s: InflatIon and devaluatIon
At the end of the 1960s, when the labour market worsened again,48 
industrial workers’ discontent with their poor job conditions exploded 
again, setting in motion a cycle of industrial conflict which was to 
last until the end of the 1970s. The workers won significant advances 
in terms of wages, as in the early 1960s, but this time also in terms of 
increased control over production processes, directly questioning power 
hierarchies on the factory floor.49
46 Graziani, Lo sviluppo dell’economia italiana, 86–89; Guido Crainz, Il Paese mancato 
(Roma: Donzelli, 2005), 57–64.
47 This point is developed in Francesco Petrini, ‘Vincolo esterno e lotte sociali: gli 
industriali italiani e la fine dell'età dell'oro’, in Fra mercato comune e globalizzazione. Le 
forze sociali europee e la fine dell'età dell'oro, eds. Ilaria Del Biondo, Lorenzo Mechi and 
Francesco Petrini (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2010), 15–44. On Italy’s industrial ‘de-spe-
cialisation’ during the 1960s, see Matteo Gomellini, ‘Il commercio estero dell’Italia negli 
anni sessanta: specializzazione internazionale e tecnologia’, in Quaderni dell’Ufficio ricerche 
storiche, Banca d’Italia, no. 7, 2004.
48 More precisely, in the late 1960 s, the Italian labour market was not in a situation of 
full employment, but the growing Taylorisation of the work process had paradoxically led 
to an increase in workers’ control over production lines. In addition, the rise in the cost 
of living in towns and higher levels of education had prevented the creation of an effec-
tive ‘industrial reserve army’. See Massimo Paci, Mercato del lavoro e classi sociali in Italia 
(Bologna: il Mulino, 1973), Chap. 8.
49 This point was evidenced by Carli: ‘[The unions] aimed not only, and even not so 
much, for purely wage claims, but for the rigidity of the labour force. This was the cru-
cial point of that clash: to exonerate the workforce from the operation of market mecha-
nisms, from the ups and downs of the economy and from the autonomous decisions of 
the employers’ (Guido Carli, Intervista sul capitalismo italiano (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 
2008), 64.
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Again, as in the early 1960s, the immediate consequence of the wors-
ened social conflict was an upsurge in inflation, in an attempt to alle-
viate the profit squeeze which had followed the workers’ victories. The 
great difference with respect to 1963 was that the ensuing deflationary 
move, carried out in 1970 by the Bank of Italy, still under the guid-
ance of Carli, in collaboration with a centre-right government presided 
by Emilio Colombo, did not work. This time, deflation did not bring 
back order to the shop floor, stopping wage increases and thus restoring 
external competitiveness.50 The reason for this different outcome mainly 
lay in the increased strength of the trade unions. In the early 1960s, the 
unions were divided and still suffering from the defeats and political iso-
lation of the preceding decade, whereas in the early 1970s, although ini-
tially taken by surprise by the workers’ protests, organised by unskilled, 
non-unionised workers, they were ready to overcome their political divi-
sions and to embrace the radical democratising momentum arising from 
the rank and file.51 As a result, they were now much more entrenched in 
the factories and could thus resist attempts at normalisation, but were 
less disposed to compromise with their employers. In addition, interna-
tional conditions were not favourable to a repetition of the ‘deflation in 
one country’ move. The other major industrial countries, the markets 
for Italian exports, were slowing in growth and the international envi-
ronment had become much more competitive than a decade earlier.52 
Another crucial difference was the international mood. This time, the 
Italian situation was suffering from a general crisis of the advanced capi-
talist world, engendered by horizontal and/or vertical conflicts, that 
is, by competition among the main capitalist areas,53 and/or the clash 
50 See Carli’s gloomy considerations in ibid.: ‘At that time, I had the feeling that we had 
definitely entered a system we could define as a labour standard, that is, a system in which 
wages were the independent variable.’.
51 Robert J. Flanagan, David. W. Soskice and Lloyd Ulman, Unionism, Stabilization, 
and Incomes Policies. European Experience (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1983), 
Chap. 9.
52 Michele Salvati, ‘The Italian Inflation’, in The Politics of Inflation and Economic 
Stagnation: Theoretical Approaches and International Case Studies, eds. Leon N. Lindberg 
and Charles S. Maier (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1985), 509–563.
53 Robert Brenner, ‘The Economics of Global Turbulence. Uneven Development and 
the Long Downturn: the Advanced Capitalist Economies from Boom to Stagnation, 1950–
1998’, New Left Review, I/229 (1998): 1–265.
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6 MERCANTILISM AND CLASS STRUGGLE: …  17
between employers and workers.54 The immediate expression of this cri-
sis was the dismantling, in the early 1970s, of the Bretton Woods system. 
For Italy, this meant that, although in 1963–64 the pressures deriving 
from the need to defend the external parity of the lira had played a cru-
cial role in legitimising the deflationary manoeuvre, in the new ‘free-
for-all’ climate of the early 1970s, the vincolo esterno no longer worked. 
The disorientation of the Italian economic establishment clearly emerged 
in the words of the chairman of Assolombarda (the employers’ associa-
tion regrouping firms operating in Lombardy, the industrial heart of the 
country): ‘In practice, the mechanism of accumulation that characterised 
the Italian economy in the 1950s and 1960s seems to have stalled, and 
we have not yet found the way to restart it.’55
In their search for a way out of their predicament, Italian employ-
ers supported attempts to revive a system of rigid exchange rates on a 
European basis, not only as a way of insulating the Common Market 
from the repercussions of the international financial turmoil, but also in 
the hope of restoring external constraints on wage levels. In this regard, 
it is significant that, in March 1972, on the occasion of the launching 
of the ‘European Monetary Snake’ (the joint floating exchange rate 
system of the EEC countries), a number of articles in Confindustria’s 
daily newspaper pleaded for the adoption of a common wage policy as 
an indispensable complement to the monetary measures.56 But hopes of 
reviving the ‘lever pressing on the wage level’ soon came into conflict 
with the modest results achieved by attempts at macro-economic coordi-
nation of the EEC countries.57
Since the newly acquired force of the trade unions and the turmoil 
into which international monetary relations were mired were against 
54 Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn and John Harrison, Capitalism Since 1945 (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1991) 169-207. For an interpretation of the crisis which combines the horizon-
tal and vertical conflicts within the context of the decline in US hegemony, see Giovanni 
Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the 21st Century (London: Verso, 2009), 
116–39.
55 Giuseppe Pellicanò, ‘Riflessi della situazione internazionale sull’industria italiana’, 
Mondo Economico, 5 February 1972, 49.
56 See, for example, Lo squilibrio nello squilibrio (le strutture salariali nella Cee), Il Sole 
24 Ore, 18 March 1972; ‘Assemblea dell’Assolombarda’, Milan, April 6 1972, Relazione 
del presidente G. Pellicanò’, Mondo Economico, 15 April 1972.
57 Risultati modesti, Il Sole 24 Ore, 2 November 1972.
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18  F. PETRINI
any resort to deflation as a way of countering wage pressures, price 
hikes were the only means left to defend profits. As a result, inflation 
escalated, partly alimented by the steep rise in the prices of raw materi-
als and labour costs after the ‘pay explosion’: in 1971–72, Italy’s infla-
tion rate, although accelerating, was around 5%, lower than Germany’s; 
in 1973, it soared to 10.8%.58 Consequently, concern was expressed 
about the loss of competitiveness that the pegging of the lira to the 
deutschmark through the Snake, together with increases in the cost of 
labour, had caused for Italian exports. For example, commenting on the 
Smithsonian Agreement which briefly revived the Bretton Woods system, 
Confindustria’s newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore clearly perceived the need for 
devaluation:
At the political level, the need for a restoration of the business margins will 
arise. This can be achieved through a substantial devaluation […]. Italian 
workers have to understand that it is not possible to increase the real value 
of wages by 20–30% in one year and then not accept a devaluation.59
The monetary storm of early 1973 led to the lira abandoning the Snake 
and floating free—a prelude to a series of sharp devaluations which 
allowed the Italian economic system to withstand the impact of high 
rates of domestic inflation. As commented by the influential weekly mag-
azine Mondo Economico: ‘The European Monetary Snake is an intolerable 
straitjacket for economies that go each on its way.’60
The final demise of the Bretton Woods world of virtually fixed 
exchange rates and the passage to floating rates meant that devalua-
tion could be used to over-compensate internal inflation, thus boosting 
exports and maintaining acceptable profit levels. Overall, in the period 
1973–80, the lira exchange rate recorded a fall of 54.6%, with an aver-
age yearly devaluation of 9%.61 The lira’s true effective exchange rate, 
deflated by unit labour cost, fell by 20%.62 (See Fig. 6.1.)
58 ISTAT, Serie storiche, http://seriestoriche.istat.it/fileadmin/documenti/
Tavola_21.8.xls (accessed on 13 January 2017).
59 ‘Quale è il costo dei cambi fissi?’, Il Sole 24 Ore, 5 January 1972.
60 ‘Unione monetaria. Una politica da riformulare’, Mondo economico, 24 February 1973, 
13.
61 Ciocca and Toniolo, Storia economica d’Italia, 442.
62 Gaiotti and Rossi, La politica monetaria italiana, 316.
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The devaluation of the lira turned out to be quite effective in terms 
of GDP growth and defence of profits. In 1973–74, the economy 
grew at rates similar to those of the ‘economic miracle’, with an aver-
age yearly GDP growth (in real terms) of 6.3%.63 However, the sudden 
rise in imports produced by the booming economy, the ‘skyrocketing’ 
of the cost of imported energy due to the oil shock, and worsening of 
terms of trade caused a drastic worsening in the balance of payments. 
During 1974, the government was therefore forced to ask for interna-
tional financial assistance.64 In return, it pledged to contain inflation. 
The Central Bank and the government implemented a very restrictive fis-
cal and monetary manoeuvre.65 The result was a slump in 1975, when 
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Fig. 6.1 Lira, real effective exchange rates, 1970–1999, based on CPI, 
monthly averages; 2010 = 100. Source Bank of International Settlements
63 Ciocca and Toniolo, Storia economica d’Italia, 443.
64 In April, Italy received from the IMF a stand-by credit line of up to 1 billion Special 
Drawing Rights. In August, the German Bundesbank granted a loan of $2 billion, taking as 
collateral the gold reserves of the Bank of Italy. Lastly, in December, the EEC conceded a 
loan of $1.4 billion.
65 In implementing their restrictive policy, the Italian authorities ended up being plus roy-
aliste que le roi, applying measures much harsher that those recommended by the IMF; 
see Luigi Spaventa, ‘Two Letters of Intent: External Crises and Stabilization Policy, Italy 
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20  F. PETRINI
for the first time since the end of the Second World War, GDP growth 
became negative, while inflation continued unabated. Once again, in a 
situation characterised by international instability and a strong labour 
force at home, deflationary measures failed to restore profitability.
The difficult conditions prevailing in the Italian economy led to a 
new sharp devaluation of the lira early in 1976. Exploiting the differ-
ent courses of the US dollar and the German mark, the Italian monetary 
authorities adopted a policy of ‘asymmetric’ or ‘differentiated’ devalua-
tion, allowing the lira to lose value against the mark (to the benefit of a 
vast range of exports) and to devalue to a lesser extent or even revalue 
against the dollar (to the benefit of many imports). The economy 
reverted to growth. As Ciocca and Toniolo write: ‘In Italy, 1976 marked 
a real boom of the economy, with a real GDP growth of 6.2% and an 
increase of industrial production greater than 12% (a rate never again 
reached).’66 This opened a five-year spell of sustained GDP growth—
on average 4.7% between 1976 and 1980—analogous to Japan’s and 
higher than that of Italy’s European partners. It was, once again, export-
led growth. However, although between 1964 and 1972 expansion of 
exports was founded on the gains in productivity obtained by greater 
exploitation of the workforce, after 1973 the key factors became devalu-
ation and transfer of resources from employees to enterprises. In effect, 
the operation of a massive fiscal drag, that is, an increase in workers’ tax 
burden due to nominal wage rises, allowed a system of generous sub-
sidies to enterprises to be financed (mainly through cuts in social secu-
rity contributions paid by employers and passed on to the state).67 As 
pointed out by Francesco Giavazzi and Luigi Spaventa: ‘There was in 
short a redistribution from wages to industrial profits by means of an 
increased taxation of labour incomes induced by inflation rather than 
legislated by Parliament.’68
 
1973–1977’, in IMF Conditionality, ed. John Williamson (Washington: Institute for 
International Economics, 1983), 441–473.
66 Ciocca and Toniolo, Storia economica d’Italia, 457.
67 ‘Fiscal drag was responsible for an almost nine-point rise in the tax burden of industrial 
workers between 1974 and 1980, only a fraction of which was offset by discretionary meas-
ures of opposite sign’. (Francesco Giavazzi and Luigi Spaventa, ‘Italy: the Real Effects of 
Inflation and Disinflation’, Economic Policy, no. 8 (1989): 133–171, 147).
68 Ibid.
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On a more structural plan, the manufacturing sector underwent deep 
restructuring, aimed at containing labour costs, which tripled. First and 
foremost, production outside the large Ford-style factories was decen-
tralised. Entire production lines were moved from large plants to smaller 
firms. This development was part of a more general trend of the whole 
capitalist world, which slowed down and in some cases inverted the ten-
dency, almost centennial, towards increased average dimensions of firms. 
In Italy, this phenomenon acquired a particular force. There is a vast lit-
erature on the reasons for this development, which traces it back to the 
history of the country and to its particular social and economic structure, 
or to technological change.69 But it is certainly no coincidence that the 
movement towards the concentration of capital, which had been particu-
larly strong in the second half of the 1960s, was abruptly reversed in the 
harsh climate of social conflict of the 1970s. As observed by Sebastiano 
Brusco, there was a direct correlation between the intensity of employers’ 
control over the workforce and the size of the plants.70 In small firms, 
the workforce was generally less organised and often not unionised at all, 
and there was also ample recourse to black market labour, which had no 
equal in other major capitalist countries.
Secondly, the restructuring meant the geographical relocation of 
production, both inside and outside Italy. In April 1970, the country’s 
largest private firm, Fiat, announced its decision to invest heavily in pro-
duction facilities in the south of Italy, reversing a policy of investment 
which until then had been firmly anchored in Turin.71 Behind this deci-
sion there was certainly the lure of public funding for developing the 
Mezzogiorno, but also a search for new sources of labour, less highly 
organised and more docile, and a move from the large urban concen-
trations of the workforce towards smaller establishments placed in 
69 See, for example, Franco Amatori, Matteo Bugamelli and Andrea Colli, ‘Tecnologia, 
dimensione d’impresa e imprenditorialità’, in L’Italia e l’economia mondiale, 631–671.
70 Sebastiano Brusco, ‘Organizzazione del lavoro e decentramento produttivo nel settore 
metalmeccanico’, in Piccole imprese e distretti industriali, ed. Sebastiano Brusco (Torino: 
Rosenberg & Sellier, 1989), 113–117.
71 Valerio Castronovo, Fiat 1899-1999: un secolo di storia italiana (Milano: Rizzoli, 
1999), 1238; Giuseppe Berta, Conflitto industriale e struttura d’impresa alla Fiat 1919–
1979 (Bologna: il Mulino, 1998), 150–151.
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predominantly agricultural areas.72 In the same period, Fiat strength-
ened its international presence with the opening or expansion of plants 
in Poland, Yugoslavia, Spain, Turkey, Brazil and Argentina. Thus, 
while in 1968 82.8% of vehicles of the Fiat group (subsidiaries, affili-
ates or licensors) were made in Italy, this percentage had fallen steadily 
to 58.9% by 1977.73 At the same time—and this was the third aspect 
of the restructuring—the manufacturing sector underwent technologi-
cal innovation which, while apparently opening to the demands of the 
labour movement for more humanisation of work and greater protection 
of health, actually aimed at saving labour and recovering flexibility in the 
use of manpower. Cesare Romiti, CEO of Fiat during these years, pithily 
summed up the sense of the technological change, with considerations 
that concerned Fiat but which could easily be extended to the entire 
industrial system:
You [the unions] have put such emphasis on this story about producing cars 
in a new way that Fiat itself has actually done it. In fact, it now comes first. 
It was so insistent about automation that it did achieve a new way of making 
cars, but with lower production costs—that is, not in the way you imagined.74
In sum, thanks to a mix of devaluation, inflation, subsidies and large-
scale restructuring of production, Italian capitalism, although under 
pressure from the workers’ movement, managed to defend its profit lev-
els to the extent that, in the second half of the 1970s, it recorded better 
performance than its European partners (See Fig. 6.2.).
However, in the absence of a coherent industrial policy, the restruc-
turing of the manufacturing sector was left to the ‘animal spirits’ of 
Italian entrepreneurs and, contrary to the Bank of Italy’s assumption 
of a direct link between profits and investments, the 1970s confirmed 
and strengthened the tendency of Italian industry to specialise at the 
medium-low end of the technological spectrum, with a decrease in the 
72 Alberto Imazio and Carlo Costa, L’organizzazione del lavoro alla Fiat. Produzione e 
conflittualità operaia (Padova: Marsilio, 1975), 139–150.
73 Gioia Pescetto, ‘Il settore dell’auto negli anni ’60 e ’70 e la strategia della Fiat’, in 
La ristrutturazione nell’auto e nei componenti e la posizione della Fiat, Istituto Piemontese 
di Scienze Economiche e Sociali A. Gramsci (Turin, 1980), 22. According to Vincenzo 
Comito (La Fiat tra crisi e ristrutturazione (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1982), 40–1), from the 
mid-1970s Fiat investments abroad became truly alternative to those in Italy.
74 Cesare Romiti and Giampaolo Pansa, Questi anni alla FIAT (Milan: Rizzoli,1988), 89.
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amount of innovation of Italian manufactured goods.75 The respite 
afforded by devaluation was not used as a springboard towards new pat-
terns of specialisation, but as a bulwark to defend the mercantilist model 
based on containment of manpower costs.
the 1980s: ItalIan-style stabIlIsatIon
Although effective in defending profitability, recourse to the cycle 
of inflation/devaluation increased instability at home and irrita-
tion abroad.76 Italy’s trade partners did not agree with what they saw 
as unfair commercial practice by a member of the Common Market. 
German industry especially resented the competitiveness which the weak 
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Fig. 6.2 Manufacturing net profit rate in Italy, France and the Federal Republic 
of Germany, 1968–1980, 1968 = 100. Source Paul Armstrong, Andrew Glyn and 
John Harrison, Capitalism Since 1945 (Oxford, Blackwell, 1991) data appendix, 
Table A1, 352
75 Franca Falcone, Commercio internazionale e integrazione europea. Aspetti teorici ed 
esperienza italiana (Bologna: il Mulino, 1990), 247–361; on the 1970s, 261–263.
76 The word ‘stabilisation’ is used in this section in the sense Charles Maier gave it, that 
is, the ‘re-establishing [of] the overlapping hierarchies of power, wealth, and status that 
can be loosely termed “capitalist”’ (Charles S. Maier, In Search of Stability. Explorations in 
Historical Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 161).
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lira gave to exports of Italian manufactured goods. In addition, towards 
the end of the 1980s, the changing international economic climate made 
it impossible for Italy—a relatively small country, deeply integrated in 
international markets—to continue a policy which was in direct contra-
diction to
the ascendant monetarist creed, with its insistence on the containment 
of inflation as the supreme objective of economic policy. In the era of 
soaring US interest rates, ‘the highest since the birth of Jesus Christ’, 
as the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt put it in 1981, there was no 
more space for Italy’s differentiated devaluation.
At internal level, inflation seemed to intertwine with the political and 
social turmoil of years characterised by the advance of the left at local 
and national elections, violent confrontations in the streets between the 
neo-fascist right and the extra-parliamentarian left, and by the increasing 
activity of armed terrorist bands of both right and left tendencies. In this 
uneasy climate, and well aware of the geo-political constraints weighing 
on the country as a member of the Western bloc, at the beginning of the 
decade the main party of the left, the Italian Communist party (PCI), 
decided to follow a strategy of ‘national responsibility’, that is, to give 
up the prospects of a left-wing alternative and to seek an accord (the so-
called ‘compromesso storico’, or historical compromise) with the Christian 
Democrats. In 1974, the ‘No’ vote in the referendum on the abolition of 
divorce marked the defeat of the right wing of the Christian Democrats, 
opening the way to the re-launching of the centre-left coalition and to 
the intricate manoeuvring which, later, would lead to the PCI enter-
ing the governmental sphere.77 On the economic level, the February 
1975 agreement between Confindustria and the trade unions on revis-
ing the wage index system (the scala mobile, sliding scale) had radically 
altered prospects. The new system, gradually entering into force by the 
end of 1977, guaranteed wages total, automatic and equal coverage 
against inflation. This, of course, made recourse to the inflation/devalu-
ation mechanism useless as a means of defending profits because, in the 
end, it would have triggered a rise in labour costs through automatic 
77 Franco De Felice, ‘Nazione e crisi: le linee di frattura’, in Francesco Barbagallo et al., 
Storia dell’Italia Repubblicana, L’Italia nella crisi mondiale. L’ultimo ventennio (Torino: 
Einaudi, 1996), III:7–127.
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adjustment of wages, thwarting all the expected benefits for the competi-
tiveness of exports.78
Meanwhile, the rise in the cost of living and mounting unemploy-
ment (and also the evidence of a widening gap in rights and wage levels 
between workers employed by large industrial firms and those in small- 
and medium-sized ones) had weakened the trade unions and led them 
to reconsider their strategy. In January 1978, in an historic interview, 
the secretary general of the main union confederation—the communist/
socialist CGIL—also speaking on behalf of the other confederations, 
signalled the trade unions’ willingness to accept a policy of moderation, 
and explicitly recognised that the idea of wages as an independent vari-
able, which had been the central point in the trade unions’ strategy since 
1969, had been a mistake. In order to reduce unemployment (which had 
now reached the figure of 1,600,000), the economy had to be revital-
ised: ‘I am convinced that capitalism is declining. By that, I don’t mean 
that it could not improve in the medium term. [It] is in order to reach 
this objective, and to use it to reduce unemployment, that we are asking 
the working class to accept a programme of sacrifices.’79 A few days later, 
the large majority of almost 1500 delegates at the nation-wide confer-
ence of the Unitary Federation of Trade Unions pledged to accept con-
tainment in wage increases and greater flexibility in the use of labour, 
in exchange for an economic policy of investment to reduce unem-
ployment.80 Against this background, in March 1978 the PCI, for the 
first time since 1947, had a parliamentary majority with the Christian 
Democrats, although it did not have representatives in government. As 
it was, the Communists were thus directly involved in preparing the sta-
bilisation plan presented by the minister of the Treasury, Filippo Maria 
Pandolfi, in August 1978. The plan’s final aims, which echoed the views 
of Confindustria’s proposal put forward in late 1977,81 were a sustained 
78 This point was acknowledged by Carli in his first Annual Report as President of 
Confindustria, in July 1976: ‘La relazione all’Assemblea di Confindustria del 1976’, in 
Guido Carli presidente di Confindustria 1976–1980, ed. Paolo Savona (Torino: Bollati 
Boringhieri, 2008), 27–40.
79 La Repubblica, 24 January 1978.
80 Lorenzo Bertucelli, Adolfo Pepe and Maria Luisa Righi, Il sindacato nella società 
industriale (Rome: Ediesse, 2008), 261–282.
81 See ‘L’Operazione sviluppo and Documento del 20 ottobre 1977 presentato al 
governo e alla federazione unitaria CGIL-CISL-UIL’, in Guido Carli presidente di 
Confindustria, 169–184.
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rate of growth and an increase in employment levels, but these aims were 
in contradiction with the deflationary bias of the envisaged policies: cuts 
in public expenditure, no increase in real labour costs (and consequently 
stagnant real wages) and greater flexibility in the use of manpower 
(essentially: greater possibilities for lay-offs). Again, the only possibility 
of growth meant increasing exports. In this context, controlling inflation 
was essential, if the benefits of devaluation and containment of labour 
costs were to be reaped.82
An essential contribution to the consolidation of the conserva-
tive anti-inflationary front came from the ‘vincolo esterno’. The nascent 
European Monetary System (EMS) was a challenge for Italy, meaning 
that the strategy followed until then inevitably had to be revised; at the 
same time, the anti-inflationary front had to be consolidated. The choice 
for Europe, in this case embodied by the EMS, was presented (as was 
to happen later) as the last chance to rescue a political and social sys-
tem which seemed increasingly out of control. Participation in the EMS 
justified the stabilising measures envisaged by the Pandolfi plan—a sacri-
fice for the sake of the good cause of European integration, but also an 
unavoidable necessity, if Italy was to remain attached to the European 
train.83 According to Carli, then chairman of Confindustria, the Italian 
entry into the EMS could stimulate ‘the acceleration of the agreement 
between the social and political forces on the [Pandolfi] plan and a firmer 
commitment to tighten the constraints that it imposes’.84 As stated by 
the Christian Democrat senator Beniamino (Nino) Andreatta, one of 
Italy’s most influential economists, during the parliamentary debate on 
the EMS:
82 The text of the Pandolfi plan appears in Giangiacomo Nardozzi (ed.), I difficili anni 
’70. I problemi della politica economica italiana 1973–79 (Milano: ETAS, 1980), 23–56. 
For an insightful analysis of the document, see Andrea Jovane and Paolo Guerrieri, Le linee 
di politica economica per il rilancio dell’economia italiana: un’analisi critica, in La politica 
economica italiana degli anni ’70. Un’analisi critica, eds. Paolo Garonna et al. (Venezia: 
Marsilio, 1979), 79–104.
83 See, for example, the contributions of the businessman and Christian Democrat MP 
Francesco Merloni and Filippo Maria Pandolfi, in La lira e lo scudo: la scommessa europea, 
eds. Beniamino Andreatta et al. (Bologna: il Mulino, 1978) 103–111 and 123–138.
84 Guido Carli, ‘La partecipazione dell’Italia allo SME’, Prospettive Settanta, no. 4 
(1978): 3–6.
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We believe that anchoring our country to the European écu will give us 
a stable point of reference that can only be beneficial for the debate on 
the Pandolfi plan. In this perspective, the intolerability of an integral wage 
indexation becomes evident […]. [We] have to aim high, to commit our-
selves to a policy of stabilisation, even if such a policy implies sacrifices for 
the industrial worker, whose wage […] has dwindled in real terms. But 
I believe that in the first phase of the adjustment it will be necessary to 
endure a real wage reduction of even 1–2%.85
In spite of the opposition of both the Bank of Italy and the PCI, the 
government headed by Giulio Andreotti decided to follow the Schmidt–
Giscard proposal. The Bank of Italy was doubtful about the asymmetric 
character of the new system and feared possible losses of reserves while 
trying to remain within the fluctuation band and the ultimate loss of 
credibility if the lira could not fulfil its commitments. This would strike 
a deadly blow at any strategy of stabilisation.86 The asymmetric character 
of the exchange mechanism, which assigned the burden of adjustment 
to the debtor countries, and the lack of any real commitment in support 
of the weaker countries, induced the PCI and other voices on the left 
to criticise the predictable social effects of an agreement which appeared 
to be tailored to Germany’s deflationary bias. Ultimately, the PCI voted 
against entry into the EMS, thus terminating its participation in the gov-
ernmental majority.
However, the end of the Communist party’s participation in the stabi-
lising effort was not a return to the old pattern of industrial conflict. The 
PCI had not yet defined any clear alternative after the failure of the com-
promesso storico.87 In addition, the thorough restructuring undergone by 
Italian industry and the worsening of the international economic climate, 
following the second oil shock and the monetarist turn in the USA and 
the UK, had irremediably weakened the unions’ position. The change 
in the balance of power in industrial relations was clear-cut in autumn 
85 ‘Intervention at the Senate of the Republic, December 7 1978’, in La Lira e lo scudo, 
141–156.
86 Gigliobianco, Via Nazionale, 324–326.
87 On the PCI positions in the 1970 s and immediately afterwards, see: Lucio Magri, The 
Tailor of Ulm. Communism in the Twentieth Century (London: Verso, 2011), 244–347; 
Leonardo Paggi and Massimo D’Angelillo, I comunisti italiani e il riformismo. Un con-
fronto con le socialdemocrazie europee (Torino: Einaudi, 1986).
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1980, when the ‘march of the 40,000’ white-collar Fiat workers in Turin 
imposed the end of a 35-day sit-down strike at Fiat plants, against the 
announcement of 14,000 lay-offs by the management.88 With the defeat 
of the unions at Fiat, the heart of Italian industry, a new season of indus-
trial relations began, with a drastic decline in conflict and reaffirmation of 
employers’ authority on the shop floor.
As evidenced by Roberto Gualtieri,89 Italy’s stabilisation after the tur-
bulent 1970s followed a peculiar path, a sort of ‘third way’ between the 
conflictual stabilisation of Thatcherism and the consensual stabilisation of 
the neo-corporatist countries of Northern Europe.90 After the collapse 
of the ‘compromesso storico’, which could be equated to a neo-corporat-
ist attempt to build a Grosse Koalition involving the trade unions in the 
disinflationary process, during the 1980s Italy achieved ‘monetarist sta-
bilisation’, in which management of economic policy was taken over by 
the technocratic élite of the Bank of Italy, and politics was relegated to a 
‘residual role’, that is, to guarantee the existence of a sufficiently broad 
and stable parliamentary majority, consistent as far as was possible with 
the necessities dictated by the policy of stabilisation.
In the aftermath of the second oil shock, inflation peaked in 1980, 
although two moves consolidated the new anti-inflationary course of 
Italy’s macro-economic policy. One was the ‘St. Valentine’s decree’ of 
1984 by the government, with the assent of the non-communist trade 
unions, which reduced the wage index system in an attempt to break 
what was seen as a vicious circle between wage indexes and inflation. 
This measure, attacking one of the main union achievements of the 
1970s, caused the collapse of the trade unions’ unitary federation. The 
communist sections of the CGIL and the PCI called for a referendum 
against the measure. Their defeat in the polls one year later definitely 
marked the opening of a new epoch. The electorate had embraced the 
promises of growth which monetarist stabilisation seemed to reveal.
The other element consolidating the anti-inflationary attitude of 
Italian economic policies was the decision taken in July 1981 by the 
88 Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, 402–405.
89 Roberto Gualtieri, ‘L’impatto di Reagan. Politica ed economia nella crisi della prima 
repubblica, 1978–1992’, in Gli anni ottanta come storia, 90–191.
90 This dichotomy is taken from Michele Salvati, Occasioni mancate. Economia e politica 
in Italia dagli anni ’60 a oggi (Rome/Bari: Laterza, 2000), 59–64.
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minister of the Treasury, Nino Andreatta, in agreement with the gover-
nor of the Bank of Italy, Carlo A. Ciampi, to terminate the Bank’s obli-
gation, formally established in 1975,91 to buy all government bonds left 
unsold. The result of a simple exchange of letters between Andreatta and 
Ciampi, not submitted to parliament (an ‘open plot’, as stated later by 
Andreatta),92 the ‘divorce’ between the Treasury and the Bank gave the 
latter effective independence in managing monetary policy. The ‘divorce’ 
also had the effect of making the pursuit of a policy of high interest rates 
in order to entice investors into buying state bonds inevitable. The high 
interest rates also kept the lira within the EMS fluctuation band. The 
soaring interest rates were the main source of the steep rise in the public 
debt ratio, which rose from 59.5% in 1980 to 99.1% in 1990 (reaching 
120% in the mid-1990s).93 (See Fig. 6.3).
In spite of lower prices, the diverging inflation rate with respect to the 
more ‘virtuous’ European countries remained significant, and this led to 
an increase in the exchange rate of the lira in real terms. The frequent 
re-alignments of the exchange rates which took place in the first phase 
of the EMS were not sufficient to compensate the inflationary spread. In 
addition, after the Basel-Nyborg agreement of 1987, the EMS in prac-
tice became a system of fixed exchange rates,94 thus accentuating the 
problem of competitiveness for the Italian economy. The industrial sys-
tem was forced to compete with countries (starting with the FRG, but 
91 Historical Archive of the Bank of Italy (Rome), Carte Baffi, Governatore Onorario, 
n.136, fasc.8, Verbale della 201 ‘Riunione del Comitato interministeriale per il credito ed il 
risparmio, tenuta il 21 marzo 1975’, 26 June 1975.
92 Beniamino Andreatta, ‘Il divorzio tra Tesoro e Bankitalia e la lite delle comari’, Il 
Sole 24 Ore, 26 July 1991. The two letters exchanged between Andreatta and Ciampi to 
implement the ‘divorce’ appear in Beniamino Andreatta et al., L’autonomia della politica 
monetaria. Il divorzio Tesoro-Banca d’Italia trent’anni dopo (Bologna: il Mulino, 2011), 
99–105.
93 Giuliano Garavini and Francesco Petrini, ‘Il “divorzio” tra Tesoro e Banca d’Italia: il 
vincolo interno e le origini del problema del debito pubblico italiano’, in Al governo del 
cambiamento. L’Italia di Craxi tra rinnovamento e obiettivi mancati, eds. Daniele Caviglia 
and Silvio Labbate (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2014), 39–71.
94 For a careful overview of the EMS in the 1980s, see André Szász, The Road to 
European Monetary Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), Chap. 8.
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also the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Denmark), whose currencies 
underwent a process of devaluation in real terms.95 (See Table 6.1).
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Fig. 6.3 Italian public debt, interest expenditure/GDP, 1960–1995. Sources 
Mario Arcelli and Stefano Micossi, ‘La politica economica negli anni Ottanta (e 
nei primi anni Novanta)’, in Storia, economia e società in Italia 1947–1997, ed. 
Mario Arcelli (Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1997), 263–322, Tab. 3, La sostenibilità 
del debito pubblico, 310–311; ISTAT, Conti economici nazionali, http://serie-
storiche.istat.it/ (last accessed 13 January 2017)
Table 6.1 Inflation differentials and nominal and real exchange rates of the lira, 
1979–1991 (cumulated percentage variations)
Data: Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli, Storia monetaria d’Italia. Lira e politica monetaria 
dall’Unità all’Unione Europea (Milano: ETAS, 2001), 489
Inflation differential Nominal devaluation Real appreciation
Belgium 73.0 24.5 48.5
Denmark 50.5 32.7 17.8
France 43.8 11.3 32.5
Germany 92.3 51.4 40.9
Ireland 24.6 17.7 6.9
The Netherlands 92.6 46.8 45.8
95 Jan A. Kregel, ‘La politica del cambio della Banca d’Italia e la ristrutturazione 
dell’industria italiana, 1980–1985’, in Il ruolo della Banca centrale nella recente evoluzione 
dell’economia italiana, ed. Giangiacomo Nardozzi (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1993), 59–98.
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The Bank of Italy, under its governor Ciampi, closely followed this 
policy of monetary discipline and strong currency, in the hope that it 
would stimulate the Italian productive system to modernise and make 
a technological leap towards higher value-added production.96 In fact, 
for the majority of Italian industry, this did not happen. Most Italian 
employers, now that deflation had restored order to the factories, pre-
ferred to remain on the path opened in the mid-1960s—low invest-
ments in new technology and reliance on the manpower cost differential. 
This, in an increasingly interconnected world, characterised by the rise 
of newly industrialised countries and by the entry into the labour market 
of huge masses of underpaid industrial workers, appeared to have been a 
losing bet. But this did not mean that Italian productivity lagged behind. 
In fact, as shown in Fig. 6.4, the productivity of Italian workers was not 
much lower than that of German workers. In some periods it was even 
higher—for instance, in the second halves of the 1960s and the 1980s.
It is therefore evident that, in these years, the troubles of the Italian 
economy had less to do with the non-productivity of Italian workers 
than with the constraints imposed by entry into the EMS. In the sec-
ond half of the 1980s, the increasing rigidity of the EMS, the weakness 
of the US dollar, which reduced possibilities of finding alternative out-
lets for Italian exports and, lastly, the 1990 decision to adopt the stricter 
Inflation
Differential
Nominal 
Devaluation
Real
Appreciation
Belgium 73,0 24,5 48,5
Denmark 50,5 32,7 17,8
France 43,8 11,3 32,5
Germany 92,3 51,4 40,9
Ireland 24,6 17,7 6,9
The Netherlands 92,6 46,8 45,8
Fig. 6.4 GDP at 2005 market prices per person employed in Italy and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, yearly percentage change, 1961–1999 Source 
AMECO Database
96 Gianni Bonaiuti, ‘Oltre il governo del credito: finalità e limiti nell’azione della 
Banca d’Italia negli anni Ottanta’, in Il ruolo della Banca centrale nella recente evoluzione 
dell’economia italiana, ed. Giangiacomo Nardozzi (Milano, FrancoAngeli, 1993), 23–58; 
John B. Goodman, Monetary Sovereignty. The Politics of Central Banking in Western 
Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 158–167.
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fluctuation band of ±2.25% for the lira, further exacerbated the prob-
lem for the Italian economy.97 Inflation, after having fallen to its lowest 
level in 1987, started to rise again, as a result of the increase of prices in 
the services sector and, paradoxically, of the capital influx caused by the 
newly acquired credibility of the lira and high interest rates.
conclusIon: the dIsaPPeaRance of the ‘InteRnal 
constRaInt’
When, in September 1992, the EMS collapsed under the weight of the 
policy of high interest rates adopted by the Bundesbank in order to cush-
ion the inflationary effects of financing German reunification, the lira 
reacquired its freedom to fluctuate.98 By April 1993, it had lost almost 
30% with respect to the mark. Its exchange rate then stabilised around a 
level 25% lower than in the past,99 allowing a sudden recovery in exports. 
But, again, the respite due to devaluation was not used to obviate the 
most evident weaknesses of the Italian industrial system. On the con-
trary, in July 1992, the agreement between Confindustria and the unions 
definitively ended the wage index system and, a year later, the new agree-
ment on the cost of labour, which linked wage bargaining to the pro-
grammed rate of inflation,100 definitely marked the end of the ‘internal 
constraint’ for the Italian productive system, with the disappearance of a 
strong labour movement capable of making employers follow a strategy 
of growth different from pure containment of the cost of manpower.101 
97 On the Italian economy in the 1980s, see Felice Roberto Pizzuti (ed.), L’economia 
italiana dagli anni Settanta agli anni Novanta (Milano: McGraw-Hill, 1994).
98 A good account of the September 1992 crisis can be found in Barry Eichengreen, The 
European Economy since 1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 357–366.
99 On Italian economic policy during these years, see the memoirs of the then minister 
of the Treasury, Piero Barucci, L’isola Italiana del Tesoro. Ricordi di un naufragio evitato 
(1992–1994), (Milano: Rizzoli, 1995).
100 Bertucelli, Pepe and Righi, Il sindacato nella società industriale, 354–355; see 
also Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro, Assemblea del 12/7/1994, 
‘Considerazioni ed indicazioni su ‘Le relazioni sindacali in Italia’’ (Roma: CNEL, 1994), 
911–984.
101 I owe this idea of ‘internal constraint’ to Riccardo Bellofiore’s reconstruction of 
the thoughts of Claudio Napoleoni, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/claudio-
napoleoni_%28Il-Contributo-italiano-alla-storia-del-Pensiero:-Economia%29/ (accessed 
on 13 January 2017) and to Alberto Bagnai, Declino, produttività, flessibilità, euro: il mio 
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At the same time, the onset of a vast programme of privatisation, the 
largest ever achieved in an advanced capitalist country, carried out under 
the motto ‘Europe wants it!’, meant renouncing any possibility of indus-
trial policy and economic planning and, in many cases, led to dismal 
results.102 (See Fig. 6.5).
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Fig. 6.5 The end of the ‘internal constraint’: labour conflicts in Italy, hours 
lost in industry 1960–2000 Source Istat, http://seriestoriche.istat.it/fileadmin/
allegati/Mercato_del_lavoro/Tavole/Tavola_10.22.xls. (last accessed 13 January 
2017)
primo maggio, http://goofynomics.blogspot.it/2013/05/declino-produttivita-flessibilita-
euro.html (accessed on 13 January 2017).
 
102 See the situation in the steel sector, in which all Italy’s major integrated mills (in 
Genova, Piombino and Taranto), after having been sold to private Italian groups in the 
1990 s, have now been dismantled or are out of production; and in the telecommunica-
tions sector, in which Telecom Italia, the main offspring of privatisation in the 1990s, 
ended up heavily indebted and sold to foreign investors. On the 1990s’ privatisations, see 
Barbara Curli, ‘The “vincolo europeo”, Italian Privatization and the European Commission 
in the 1990s’, Journal of European Integration History, no. 2 (2012), 285–301; Gianluigi 
Da Rold, Assalto alla diligenza. Il bottino delle privatizzazioni all'italiana (Milano: Guerini 
e Associati, 2012).
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The beginning of the process of entering the euro area, in the late 
1990s, marked a return to the pattern of real appreciation of the cur-
rency and the deteriorated competitiveness of Italian products. As in 
the 1980s, and to an even greater extent, the dramatic weakening of the 
labour movement meant that strong external constraints did not spur 
the industrial system to evolve towards higher value-added productions. 
On the contrary: although remaining second in Europe for size, Italian 
industry over the last 20 years has experienced low levels of investments 
in new technologies and stagnant productivity,103 flanking the decline 
in workers’ relative shares of products and rights. In the ‘good’ years, 
these processes were somewhat alleviated by influxes of capital, the hous-
ing bubble (Italy has one of the world’s highest rates of home owner-
ship) and a relatively low level of unemployment, thanks to the creation 
of jobs in the services sector and, in the 1980s, to the counter-cyclical 
effect of expanding employment in the public sector and, later, the crea-
tion of a large number of temporary—and poorly paid—positions. But, 
when the crisis came, the asymmetries in the euro architecture emerged 
fully, exposing the failure of a whole model of development.
103 See data in Nicholas Craft and Marco Magnani, ‘L’età dell’oro e la seconda globaliz-
zazione’, in L’Italia e l’economia mondiale, op. cit., 97–145, here 130–133.
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